A NEO-SCOTIST THEORY OF PERCEPTION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

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« Il y a une sphère considérable de la pensée du Docteur Subtil qui est encore dans l'ombre et qui pourrait bien être porteuse d'un nouveau message pour la pensée philosophique. Ce nouvel apport... c'est l'intuition scotiste ».

C. BÉRUBÉ

I. - THE GERM OF THE CONCEPT OF PREHENSIVE PERCEPTION IN SCOTUS

It is said about Pierre Teilhard de Chardin that he liberated theology from the grip of the Aristotelian world.

In similar terms C. L. Shircel describes the significance of Scotus' epistemology: «Scotus was blazing a new trail and making a definite break with Aristotelian tradition».

Our own epoch is the witness to the activity of liberating forces in several major fields of contemporary thought. It seems that in theology as well as in epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics the revival can be traced back, ultimately, to the ideas which show an affinity with those of Duns Scotus, not necessarily as a result of a direct influence only but also as a striking coincidence.

But before one can embark on the outline of any serious synthesis it is better to deal thoroughly with the details first. And it is this very limited task that I have chosen for the subject of my present paper.

I wish to discuss epistemology only, and in this field, perception alone. Epistemological convictions usually exercise a great influence on the formation of philosophical systems, but I shall not develop this point in the present paper.

I think it is important what E. Bettoni says in his article in the *Enciclopedia filosofica*[1] that researches concerning Duns Scotus' thought should not be confined to historical studies only but that there should be also a line of purely theoretical research pursued. I would like to add my attempt to the work going on in both fields.

In my discussion I shall concentrate on the intuitive cognition in Duns Scotus, not on the abstractive. There are a number of important items that have already been established concerning Scotus' intuitive cognition thanks to profound and painstaking researches by such scholars as C. L. Shircel, C. Devlin, E. Longpré, Beraud de Saint-Maurice, R. Messner, H. Klug, S. Day, E. Gilson, C. Bérubé. Many points have been already discussed, wrong interpretations have been cleared up, certain controversial points either have been established at last or seem to approach a solution. On these results achieved so far further researches can be safely based.

However, I would like to stress some points which, as it seems to me, have not been sufficiently stressed up to now.

As we know, Scotus seems to be the first scholastic to try to incorporate the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition into his system on any large scale. *De primo principio* is an indication that Scotus had developed his doctrine on intuitive cognition at the beginning of his teaching career. Together with the texts on intuitive cognition in *Quodlibet*, *Ordinatio* and *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* it is a proof that the doctrine of intuitive cognition is an integral part of Scotus' doctrine but that it underwent an evolution in his thought.

In his descriptive analysis of cognitive process Scotus makes it clear first how intuitive cognition is distinguished from the abstractive. He talks of the two types of cognitive act, one abstractive, concerned with the quiddity of the object, the other intuitive, which concerns the object as present and existing, the object «in its existential reality» (Longpré).

«Intellectio est duplex, una quiditativa, quae abstrahit ab exsistentia, - alia quae dicitur visio, quae est exsistentis ut exsistens»[2].

[1] BETTONI E., *Scoto Giovanni Duns*, in *Enciclopedia filosofica*, Venezia-Roma, IV, 1957, 466.
[2] *In Metaph.* VII q. 15 n. 4 (ed. VIVÈS VII 436).

«Potest enim aliqua esse cognitio obiecti, secundum quod abstrahit ab omni exsistentia actuali, et potest esse aliqua [cognitio] eius, secundum quod exsistens et secundum quod praesens in aliqua exsistentia actuali»[3].

«Cum ibi [in cognitione intuitiva] obiectum non ut in specie agat, sed ut in se praesens...»[4].

These two modes are not accidents of the same species of the cognitive act. The difference is deeper:

«Actus abstractivus et intuitivus differunt specie, quia aliud et aliud est ibi movens: hic enim movet species similis rei, ibi autem movet res praesens in se»[5].

They are two different species of the cognitive act. Although they are not distinguished by the object as such, they are distinguished by «rationes formales» required to motivate the intellect to one or the other of the two kinds of cognition. The «ratio formalis» which moves the intellect to abstractive cognition is «aliquid in quo res habet esse cognoscibile», i.e. a species or similitude.

Abstractive cognition is described by Scotus as the knowledge of an object in a diminished similarity, as the knowledge merely by species and phantasm, universal concepts or representations of things, while intuitive cognition is characterized as a knowledge of the existent thing, in so far as it is existent, a knowledge precisely of a present object in so far as it is present and of an existing object in so far as it is existing[6]. Intuitive knowledge is for Scotus knowledge of the object itself, without any medium whatsoever (a quidity, diminished similitude, phantasm, species).

In abstractive cognition only part of the object is apprehended; in intuitive cognition the whole of it:

«Omnis intellectio abstractiva et non-intuitiva est aliquo modo imperfecta. Cognitio autem intuitiva est obiecti ut obiectum est praesens in exsistentia actuali, et hoc in se vel in alio continente eminenter totam entitatem ipsius»[7].

Let us first consider Scotus' contention with reference to the sensuous level of cognition. In what sense is the difference between

[3] *Ord.* II d. 3 q. 9 n. 6 (ed. VIVÈS XII 212).
[4] *Ord.* III d. 14 q. 4 n. 3 (ed. VIVÈS XIV 534).
[5] *Ord.* IV d. 49 q. 12 n. 6 (ed. VIVÈS XXI 442).
[6] Cf. *Ord.* I d. 1 n. 35 (I 23-24); d. 2 n. 394 (II 352); d. 8 n. 187 (IV 257); *Rep.* IV d. 45 q. 3 n. 13 (ed. VIVÈS XXIV 575b-576a); *Quodl* q. 13 n. 8 (ed. VIVÈS XXV 521a).
[7] *Ord.* I d. 2 n. 394 (II 352).

abstractive and intuitive cognition found verified for Scotus on the sensuous level?

A. - *There are two species of percepts*

First, Scotus draws a difference between actually perceiving a thing and imagining it:

«In parte sensitiva est distinctio inter actum visus et actum phantasiae» [8].

When we look at a thing we see a really existing thing; when we have a sensible image of it in imagination our cognitive act is abstractive, we have only its representation its diminished similitude.

However, to see a really existing thing and to see something as really existing is not the same. Actually perceiving is not the same as perceiving something *as* actually existing. The difference is in the aspects. The difference is in the point of view. The latter is a particular structure of my own perceiving, and of its contents. The former may be someone else's assumption referring to my seeing. In the latter case we think about things that they exist, in the former case we are cognitively in touch experientially with the aspect of things which is called «as existing». The latter has a metaphysical character, the former epistemological and phenomenological.

It seems to me that Scotus is also aware of a difference in the cognitive approach of the perceiver within the range of «external senses» as well, apart from imagination. This seems to be noticed in passing by S. Day [9], but is not brought out in his discussion.

Let us remember Scotus' constant use of *ut*. The stress on *ut* seems to be an important point of the doctrine, even if he does not develop it himself. Scotus does not speak of a «visio exsistentis *quando* aliquid est exsistens et praesens» but of the «visio exsistentis *ut* exsistentis et praesentis». In a different context, he uses

[8] *Ibid.* d. 1 n. 35 (II 24).
[9] Day S., *Intuitive Cognition, a Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics*, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947, 49. 80. 68.

the sufficient «quoties», for example: «primas cogitationes habet homo quoties surgit a somno». It is not only when the object is absent that our cognitive attitude is abstractive. Also when we have it in front of our eyes but do not notice it as actually existing that our cognitive act is abstractive: it does not take the object into account as actually existing:

«Vel obiectum non exsistit, vel saltem illa cognitio non est eius ut actualiter exsistens» [10].

S. Day notices this duality of the reason which qualifies an act as abstractive, but he does not take up the implications. A similar inconclusiveness seems to be found in C. Bérubé's excellent historical study of Scotus' intuition [11].

However, the implications are interesting for a theoretical analysis. The awareness of this duality of the cause making the cognitive approach abstractive elucidates the fact that we indeed most often assume that perceptual attitude which abstracts from the actual existence of the thing, in which attention does not concentrate on it *as* actually existing, although we do in fact perceive it: the object «ne tombe point sous la connaissance..., sous la raison de son existence» [12].

Usually there are very many objects in our perceptual field but most often we are hardly aware of them *as* actually existing and present. Rather we are vaguely aware of them only *as* things *classified* according to their useful functions. Even when we sometimes look at an object with a more defined or differentiated interest it is even then possible that we look at it above all as a representative of a class; «we see our ideas», as Krishnamurti puts it. This is noticed also by Schopenhauer, Bergson, Croce, Roger Fry.

When we do not know the object we are looking at, even then we most often by-pass looking itself and look merely in order to immediately look for the «meaning», which in most cases is just the function of the thing. As soon as we are looking for this meaning alone the attention loses touch with the thing *as* actually

[10] *Quodl.* q. 13 n. 8 (ed. Vivès XXV 321).
[11] Bérubé C., *La connaissance de l'individuel au moyen âge*, Montréal-Paris 1964. Cf. Copleston F., *On Seeing and Noticing*, in *Philosophy* (1954).
[12] Bérubé, *op. cit.* 180-181.

existing, and becomes diverted to its function. In this sense, «'what does it mean' is the primitive reaction which prevents perception» [13].

The type of perceptual attention, the type of interest which moulds consciousness, the routine of immediate attentiveless classifying the thing - the technique opposed to Scotus' intuition - is excellently summarized in a few words in H. H. Price's book, *Thinking and Experience:*

«Teleologically, the point of being conscious... is that it enables one to recognize one's food or one's enemies...».

And further on:

«I may have the merest glimpse of the bird flying by, while my attention is occupied in painting a picture of a rock-strewn stream... yet I recognize the object as a raven without difficulty and straight off» [14].

It is when we begin to be interested in a thing *as* this, that our attention becomes in fact no longer abstractive but changes into «intuitive». Our attention concentrates then on the object as actually existing.

In other words, as Cresswell rightly remarks when considering a basis for singling out what we perceive:

«The object before me can be 'singled out' as an individual or as the kind of thing (a species) we call a stone» [15].

Scotus is not only aware that we can either see a colour or imagine a colour:

«Notandum quod in sensu est una cognitio intuitiva, primo propria; alia primo et per se propria per speciem, sed non intuitiva... Exemplum de primo: visus videt colorem; de secundo: phantasia imaginatur colorem» [16].

He is aware, too, that our attention may be engaged by a thing *as* «this», not only as belonging to a class. Thus even when seeing a colour we may be interested in it as belonging to a class, as a representative of a class:

[13] HAMPSHIRE S., *Logic and Appreciation*, in *Aesthetics and Language*, ed. W. ELTON, Oxford 1959, 166.

[14] PRICE H. H., *Thinking and Experience*, London 1953.

[15] CRESSWELL J. R., *Duns Scotus on the Common Nature*, in *John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965*, ed. J. K. RYAN and B. M. BONANSEA, Washington, D.C., 1965, 123.

[16] *In Metaph.* II q. 3 n. 19 (ed. VIVÈS VII 110).

«Prius enim actualiter concipitur albedo quam color, in ordine cognitionis confusae, quia color sub ratione coloris non cognoscitur nisi sub ratione maioris abstractionis quam sit abstractio albedinis ab hac albedine» [17].

It seems that sensation may be considered, epistemologically, intuitive, but psychologically it does not have to become such.

In most cases we immediately pass on to the abstractive phase of the cognitive act, we do not dwell on the actual possibilities of allowing the intuitive act to develop as intuitive, or at least to develop together with and in spite of the simultaneous development of the abstractive phase. As soon as we perceive a quality or the individual as belonging to a class, we then get the species of perception which, as many point out today, is typical of science where of course this pointer-reading-type of perceiving has nothing to do with perceiving individuals as actually existing and present individuals.

If the intuitive phase is dwelt on, the senses concentrate, no doubt, on the accidents but not for their sake alone. The aim of the intuitive attention is the heightened awareness of the thing itself. The attention is concerned with something more than the skin-deep play of colours and spatial configurations. Fof example, even perceiving the intensity of the colour is not necessarily perceiving the object as actually existing and present. It is in the intuitive context that we can say that we can perceive a grey stone «as not grey». The perceptual situation of the intuitive act is rather like that of the dog described by A. N. Whitehead. The dog «smells in order to find out if the person in question is that 'it' to which its affections cling».

The point is not that we can or cannot know singularity itself in this life, but that attention in the intuitive act is directed by the heightened awareness of «this» thing itself. Attention becomes intransitive.

We perceive simultaneously the accidents, through the accidents (thanks to the singularity), and in spite of the accidents.

[17] *Ord.* I d. 3 n. 86 (III 58). Cf. the Commentarius of Franciscus Lychetus: «Aliquid potest dici singulare respectu speciei specialissimae, et respectu generis proximi, et sic ascendendo. Exemplum: haec albedo...» (*ibid.*, ed. VIVÈS IX 52).

When we perceive the object not as actually existing and present, the cognitive act is concerned with the abstracted data, let us call them the *a* percepts. When we perceive the object as actually existing and present, the cognitive act is concerned with the intuitive data, let us call them the *b* percepts.

B. - *The difference between abstractive and intuitive mode occurs both on the sensuous and on the intellectual level*

I suppose a full epistemological analysis night point to a number of aspects characteristic of the cognitive intuitive act and its development.

For example, there is an interesting subject touched upon by J. R. Cresswell in his article *Duns Scotus on the Will* [18], and before him, by C. Devlin [19]. Namely, the genetically primary phases of a cognitive act are free from any act of will. It would be interesting to consider the relation between such avolitiveness and intuitive cognition. The will at a standstill - together with the imagination, as we have seen, controlled by the very object itself while attention is intransitive so as to prevent any divarication and abstractive divagation - would certainly constitute factors favourable for the development of perception disinterested and devoid of wishfulness. I suppose, theoretically, rather little is known about epistemologically pure intuitive perception. The utilitaristic bias helpful for survival, and a pragmatic urge relatively desirable in a phase of the evolution must have had a lot to do with pushing the development of perception mainly in the direction of perceiving in terms of geometrical space and easily generalizable data. There is perhaps much to be said for the results of the researches carried by Sapir, Whorf and Hojier which led them to the theory that language affects and determines the way we perceive. Time and space are not intuitions, according to Whorf, but recepts from language.

However, in the present paper I would like to consider one aspect only of intuitive perception: namely, the contention that

[18] CRESSWELL J. R., *Duns Scotus on the Will*, in *Franciscan Studies* 13 (1958)

[19] DEVLIN C., *The Psychology of Duns Scotus* (*Aquinas Society, Blackfriars*), Oxford 1950.

in the intuitive act we perceive the object *as* actually existing and present.

To perceive the object as actually existing involves the focusing of attention on it as incommensurate in terms of concepts, and as «this». The word «present» may be opposed to «absent» and to «past».

When we are perceiving the object as present, we are perceiving it as not absent, and as not having ceased to exist, that is as some identity. The object is, as it were, «held» by «hic et nunc». But what constitutes the structure of perceiving it in the present?

Scotus developed his theory of intuitive cognition with hesitations. And he held that intuitive cognition is experienced with less certainty than abstractive. S. Day expresses the opinion that this certainly strikes us as a very strange remark. I think it does not have to seem surprising, for several reasons. Certain assumptions would remove the strangeness of the remark, and these assumptions are not groundless. First, Scotus was breaking new ground, and his efforts at forging out concepts and theories were sometimes groping in face of still elusive realities. Secondly, in all probability, he was struggling not only with a theoretical analysis itself but with the material which was supplied for him also by his introspection. Thirdly, he must have felt that the abstractive bias and technique were very highly developed in the human mind compared both to the practice and theory of intuition in his sense of the word [20]. Fourthly, he must have realized that he was propounding a far reaching and even risky doctrine, as my paper is trying to show. He was more convinced, at first, as to the intellectual intuitive cognition after death than as to its occurence in this life! Fifthly, he knew that he could not appeal to introspection generally as the grounds of proof. The degree of intuitive cognition varies from individual to individual, intuitive cognition «potest» occur but does not have to, it occurs «quandoque», so he feared that on the grounds of the appeal to common introspection the doctrine of intuitive cognition might seem a

[20] *In Metaph.* VII q. 15 n. 9 (ed. VIVÈS VII 440): «Et est ista condicio obiecti non tantum per accidens concomitans, sed per se in quantum sensatum; per accidens autem semper concomitatur intellectionem quiditatinihil videtur locutus».

controversial claim. Thus his remark concerning greater certainty in abstractive cognition is not really surprising.

And so when trying to argue for intuitive cognition Scotus appealed, among other considerations, to the analysis of the structure of the remembered act of the intuitive cognition, which is richer than that of the abstractive act.

It is indubitable, he says, that we can find in the act of remembering the object, not only a conceptual likeness and a sensible likeness but also something else left: the memory of the object as actually having existed, as having been going on temporally. Imagination grasps the object under its quiddity, but memory grasps the object as having been apprehended intuitively in all its existential qualifications.

In other words, Scotus points out indirectly that in the actual intuitive perception one of its structural ingredients to be found is the percept of the duration of the object itself: «it is having existed» as well as «it is existing» are units of the actual intuitive perception, which are left in memory as «it was having existed».

In the actual perception «it is having existed» is not just remembered, it is not reproduced, it is actually perceived together with «it is existing», both elements being original percepts, if the object is being perceived *as* actually existing and present. Each present moment becomes the object of a retention still given as present. That which is given in a retention becomes the object of a retention of a retention but is still given as present.

In so far as the attention is focused on something as actually existing and present - on its «hic et nunc» - there occurs in the perceptual process the mechanism of retentions and retentions of retentions. On the one hand, we perceive something as existing now and at the same time as having existed; and on the other hand, we are thus aware of that identity continuing through change while held in the perceptual field by retentions. These percepts of durational derivativeness and of sameness belong to the *b* class of percepts.

It is not the flow of time that occupies the focus of the intuitive field of consciousness but the hightened awareness of the thing itself. The object appears as being derived from its preceding phases. The achievement of perceiving it *as* present is the achievement of perceiving it as a final phase of a chain of its

phases, while all the phases are co-present. It is, as it were, perceiving a tube, not from without as sections forming a longitude, but from the inside downwards as forming a thickness, a depth. The idea of time as something abstract, or passing, or something in which the thing is «contained» is then in fact receding altogether from the awareness. The perceived actuality of the thing involves its derivativeness perceived.

It would seem that the perceptual attention focused on something as actually hic et nunc puts us necesarily in touch with what evades its spatial and temporal limits as incommensurate. This seems to be the threshold between the developing sensuous and intellectual aspects of intuition. As we shall see later, R. Allers's query as to how the sensuous intuition may differ from the intellectual one can be perhaps answered [21].

The concept of time as well as other conceptual intrusion are pushed aside from and no longer lend colour to the focus of the intuitive perceptual field as such:

«Obiectum in se praesens... sufficit absque omni informatione ad causandum visionem, vel ex se solo cum intellectu» [22].

As to the clarity in this type of perceiving, in so far as definitions and geometrical configurations are concerned, it may well be «confused». «Cognition pertaining to a definition stops short of that intuitive cognition of an object about which a universal definition is made», according to S. Day's translation of a difficult passage in Scotus [23]. «A thing is known distinctly, says Scotus, when I can give its definition» [24]. What is actually existing, however, is indefinable. His not what it means, but its going on.

G. Marcel refers to the same perceptual mechanism in question in the following words:

«The very essence of contemplation as such consists, negatively at least, in the fact that it can never be brought to bear on a specimen as such; its object is not considered as being a member of a class or as having a place in a series; it is considered in itself».

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47. 58. 65. 67.

[21] ALLERS R., *Intuition and Abstraction*, in *Franciscan Studies* 8 (1948)
[22] *Ord.* I d. 17 n. 193 (V 231).
[23] *Quodl.* q. 7 n. 8 (ed. VIVÈS XXV 290).
[24] *Ord.* I d. 3 n. 72 (III 50).

And consequently he adds that a psychological condition of this type of perceiving is a firm grip on reality:

«Contemplation is a possibility only for somebody who has made sure of his grip on reality» [25].

C. - *There are grounds for distinguishing between intuition on the sensuous level and on the intellectual level*

Although, according to Scotus, there is no difference between the object of the senses and of the intellect if each acts properly («potentia superior operatur circa idem quod inferior, si utraque habet operationem perfectam») and although, as Scotus thinks, senses and intellect do not differ so much as seeing from hearing does: the relation of the senses to the intellect being only that of subordination; nevertheless, there is a basis, in the idea of subordination itself, on which one can analyse the difference of grade between the intuitive cognition on the sensuous and on the intellectual level.

This analysis of the possibility of the intellectual extension of intuition leads to a standpoint basically in agreement with C. Bérubé's global descriptive remark that abstractive and intuitive processes of knowing are seen by Scotus as parallel. But we find no explicit statement in Bérubé's work as to how the parallelism of the intellectual intuitive phase might be interpreted.

In T. Barth's article we read that abstraction is a process «forward from» *species specialissima,* but there is no discussion of the intuitive process [26]. Now intuition seems to be a process backward from the same point of departure. Abstractive and intuitive phases develop in opposite directions, both towards greater and greater universality, but one in the sense of abstract universality, the other in the sense of the universality of real community. It seems that when intuited, in the same way as when abstracted, the object is accessible in various dimensions or degrees.

Scotus' term for the intellectual intuition is «visio naturae exsistentis ut exsistens». We have discussed the structure of the «visio» in its sensuous roots. What does Scotus mean by nature?

[25] MARCEL G., *The Mystery of Being.*
[26] BARTH T. A., *Being, Univocity and Analogy according to Duns Scotus,* in *John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965,* ed. J. K. RYAN and B. M. BONANSEA, 214.

To understand Scotus' concept of existing nature as the object of intuitive cognition it is helpful to keep in mind Scotus' considerations of the common nature, the common nature «in itself» (neither universalized nor singularized), «universal» nature in the sense of the widest community, the univocity of being and «reale univocum» («commune reale»); and also his considerations of the awareness of something as «being» without being certain as to whether it is finite or infinite, accident or substance [27].

A. B. Wolter when writing about intuitive cognition explains that «exsistentia» according to Scotus is not grasped in and through an existential judgment but in a simple act of intellectual intuition. We are not concerned, he says, with the identification of what it is but with the assertion that it is:

«At the primary level at which this datum is presented, existence is not strictly speaking 'conceivable'; neither is intuitive awareness properly speaking a concept» [28].

This is all true; it is indeed so that intuitive awareness is not a concept. However, the intention of A. B. Wolter's passage is not the point with which we are concerned here. I am not analysing the knowing of existence itself but knowing the object *as* existing, in the «visio naturae exsistentis ut exsistens».

The object of intuitive cognition is existing nature *as* existing. But as existing, nature must have three aspects, according to Scotus.

Common nature as individualized in Socrates and in Plato is contracted by diverse in each case «haecceitas»; the «humanitas» in Socrates is not the «humanitas» in Plato, and so it is no longer common. However, there is another aspect to it.

1) Common nature taken in itself, in its less than numerical unity, neither singular (physical) nor universalized (conceptualized), in itself indifferent to this or that «haecceitas» so that it can be contracted in this or that individual, is a metaphysical, not a logical concept: it is not merely a concept. It is neither identified with similar qualities of things nor with an abstracted quiddity. It is a less than numerically one reality, a really existing

[27] Particularly *Ord.* I d. 3 n. 25. 26-27. 39 (III 16-17. 18. 26-27); d. 8 n. 100-115. 138-150 (IV 199-207. 222-227). Also *Rep.* III d. 14 q. 3 n. 12 (ed. VIVÈS XXIII 359).
[28] WOLTER A. B., *The formal Distinction,* in *John Duns Scotus 1265-1965,* ed. J. K. RYAN and B. M. BONANSEA, 58.

ingredient of things, really remaining unindividualized and thus remaining a really existing link or bridge [29].

2) Further on, such real link in all beings is what is called «natura universalis» [30].

3) The same is held by Scotus concerning the univocity of being [31]. As concept it is utterly simple and embracing all, all «genera» and categories. However, this univocal concept has a foundation in reality:

«Univocitatem... non esse unitatem mere conceptualem..., sed... cum fundamento, licet imperfecto, in re» [32].

The concept designates an ingredient in all beings, a really existing link or bridge: the «reale univocum», the «commune reale».

There is no point existing in reality where all the ingredients do not overlap. Common nature in itself, and «natura universalis», and the univocity of being are not separate things. It is one being and one universal nature, «contracted» by the common nature and by diverse innumerable singularities. But this is not analysed in the act of the intuitive cognition. As existing object of intuitive cognition existing nature forms one indisseverable complex with all its ingredients, in each particular case.

When perceptual attention is concerned with individuals as individuals infra-individual ingredient realities are involved necessarily in the epistemology of this act. Singularity does not become knowable alone apart from nature; however, it does affect the epistemological structure of the cognitive act in as much as in intuition there is no process of conceptual and analytical distinguishing of the contents, and so the whole object, existing nature, is necesarily together with the individualizing singularity [33].

[29] *Ord.* II d. 3 q. 1. n. 9 (ed. VIVÈS XII 55). Cf. CRESSWELL, *Duns Scotus on the common Nature*, 130; and OWENS J., *Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics*, in *Mediaeval Studies* 19 (1957).

[30] *Rep.* III d. 14 q. 3 n. 11 (ed. VIVÈS XXIII 358): «Cognitio intuitiva potest esse universalis et naturae».

[31] Cf. HOERES W., *Francis Suarez and the Teaching of Duns Scotus on Univocatio Entis*, in *Duns Scotus 1265-1965*, ed. J. K. RYAN and B. M. BONANSEA, Washington, D.C., 1965, 278; and BARTH T. A., *Being, Univocity and Analogy According to Duns Scotus*, *ibid.* 216. 257.

[32] BARTH T., OFM, *De univocationis entis scotisticae intentione principali necnon valore critico*, in *Antonianum* 28 (1953) 78.

[33] *In Metaph.* VII q. 13 (ed. VIVÈS VII 425): «Aliter potest dici quod sensus non est alicuius, nisi praesentis secundum naturam, et in exsistentia actuali, quod non est nisi singulare». Or elsewhere, quoted in C. Devlin's inedita: «Sensus non per se sentit singulare, tamen sentit naturam extra animam primo, sed *ut* coniunctam singularitati necessario». *Ord.* III d. 14 q. 3 n. 4 (ew. VIVÈS XIV 524): «Duplex est cognitio, scilicet abstractiva ed intuitiva...; et utraque cognitione potest cognosci tam natura, ut praecedit singularitatem, quam singulare, ut hoc»; *ibid.* n. 6 (p. 527): «De cognitione intuitiva, quae est de natura vel de singulari, ut concernit actualem exsistentiam...»; *In De anima* q. 22 n. 3 (ed. VIVÈS III 629): «Impossibile est abstrahere universalia a singulari non cognito singulari, aliter enim abstraheret ignorando a quo abstraheret».

It is only in the abstractive analysis that they become held apart, but as the existing object of the intuitive act «species specialissima» together with its real less than numerically one background, together with its real universal nature background, together with its «reale univocum» background, together with its singularity are one whole. This implies that the structure of the perceiver himself is not excluded from the epistemological structure of the object. The undercurrent of the subject-object relation is the identity of the substrate which constitutes both subject and object. In physical terms, the intuitive act arises through the subject's chemical, vegetative and sensitive concatenations with the world, which are going far back into the past; metaphysically, it arises through his singularity, the individualized nature, the common nature itself, the «natura universalis», the «reale univocum. The extension of intuitive cognition embraces the unanalysed whole in its further and further stratification, up to the stratum indentical with that of the subject. Thus the intuition recovers the epistemological fusion and transconductiveness of the object. As C. Devlin expressed it in a conversation, within the sensory display lies the perfect uniformity of omnipresent natura universalis which touches everything. In this sense, sight and hearing recover here act their common evolutionary origins in touch.

Such understanding of the cognitive object, i.e. of nature, implies the contention that there is a real link between cognitive consciousness and the universe, that consciousness is continuous with the universe, that it is the convergence of the universe upon itself. Knowing is not a process directed from outside of the universe towards it but takes place within it, between its parts rooted in the identical substrate of the «reale univocum».

It is then interconnectedness and funding that characterize

the intellectual intuitive act, not only metaphysically but also epistemologically, from the point of view both of the cognitive object and of the structure of the act itself.

The psychological elicitability (availability) of this structure of wholeness of the cognitive object is another matter. It may come to the surface of consciousness or it may not. That is why Scotus was at first hesitating whether intellectual intuition was possible or not. But finally he argued that it was a fact.

He established a rigid difference between the metaphysical order and the contingency, also between the adequate object of the intellect and the psychological indeterminacy. But apart from what his historical conditioning allowed him to know and to say, we can also see in his writing that the degree of the psychological availability is also a matter of the instability of the threshold between the conscious and the unconscious.

That this is so may be suggested, for instance, by Scotus' example of the ancient Philosophers' intuition of the oneness of being without certainty as to its inward mode [34]; similarly, we can perceive something, he says, without knowing whether it is a quality or a substance, we know that light is being but we are not certain of what sort:

«Dubitatio est quando concipitur ens..., sicut patet de lumine, utrum sit forma substantialis per se subsistens, vel accidentalis exsistens in alio, sicut forma» [35].

It seems that C. Devlin is right in his reading that Scotus explains in this spirit why Aristotle is wrong when he tries to refute Parmenides' proposition that all being is one. Aristotle argued that if everything was one being then everything was this or that individual. Scotus contradicts Aristotle's attempted refutation of Parmenides' proposition because oneness may stand for one being or one nature, not for the individual, as this is the case in intuition.

Thus the intuition of the aspect of oneness in everything might come to the surface of consciousness and subsequently be conceptualized in the case of the ancient Philosophers. Another

[34] It is probable that Heidegger's philosophy of being might have been suggested to him by this view of the intuition of being found in Scotus.
[35] *In Metaph.* IV q. 1 n. 6 (ed. Vivès VII 148).

example of the unconscious element in the mind is the duality of the will, the «desiderium naturale» for perfection. As A. B. Wolter explains in one of his articles, the inclination to perfection is contained in the unconsciousness even of a newborn baby [36].

There is another suggestion also in the Prologue to the *Ordinatio*. The passage in the Prologue, translated by A. B. Wolter, runs thus:

«His statement, I say, should be undertood of the first act which of itself is fully sufficient for the second act, but its activity its hindered at present. On account of this hindrance, the second act in the present life is not elicited from the first» [37].

Then the text is commented on by Wolter:

«By first act the scholastics understood a thing constituted in its nature with its various powers. In this case, the soul... is in the first act by the very fact that it exists. When these faculties or powers are in actual operation the soul is said to be in second act. When Scotus claims that Augustine's statement that the mind knows itself must be understood of the first, he simply means that the soul or mind by the very fact that it exists is intelligible in itself (and hence is only potentially known). As an intelligible object it is fully capable of acting as partial cause with the human intelligence to produce an actual knowledge of itself (second act). In the present life, however, ... man's intellectual activity is curtailed in such a way that he knows only what can be abstracted or deduced from sense knowledge. In the next life this impediment will be removed and the soul, or intellect will be able to elicit a direct and intuitive knowledge of its own substance» [38].

It seems there can be three further commenting points added. First, Scotus speaks of the hindrance here, not of the «impossibility». Secondly, he did, after all, admit that the knowledge abstracted or deduced from the sense knowledge is not the only knowledge in view of the intuitive cognition; correspondence then between the two acts is full but because of the «impediment» its actualization is only partial. Thirdly, therefore the process of «being elicited from the first» is a process of some transition from the unconscious to the conscious (not simply the faculties being in actual operation: otherwise Scotus would not have said «the second act is not elicited from the first»).

[36] Wolter A. B., *Duns Scotus on the natural Desire for the Supernatural*, in *The New Scholasticism* 23 (1949) 306.
[37] Wolter A. B., *Duns Scotus and the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge*, in *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 250.
[38] *Ibid.* 251.

All that is potentially known cannot be elicited into the actual act of conceptual distinct knowing, and it is in fact God himself who may actualize potential knowledge completely, as we read in the same Prologue; however, the «disposition» to producing a transition from the potential to a partially actual knowing may in fact be triggered off by any object, as we read further on[39].

Since Scotus ultimately holds that not only abstractive and inferential knowledge is for the intellect possible, the meaning of the above passage clearly verges towards the interpretation which allows for the threshold of the unconscious. The «impediment» has the character of the threshold which is not permanently fixed for any moment and any individual.

This is perhaps still further suggested also by the thought that the disparity between the cognizable range in the metaphysical order and the cognitive range as a psychological fact is not dependent on the fault of the intellect or the object itself but on the sensuous barrier in between singularity and the intellect. However, as we know, Scotus also holds that both sensuous and intellectual knowing may be exercised in the intuitive mode too, where, at least partly, some modification of the impediment becomes possible.

Certainly, Scotus' contention that the structure of man is a set of intrinsic relationships, that it is a fusion of the «reale univocum», the «natura universalis», the «natura communis» in itself, and the contracting «haecceitas», does leave room for the channel of the unconscious running through the unindividualized.

Thus Scotus' claim that the intellectual extension of intuition is possible seems to be also a claim that the threshold between the conscious and the unconscious is not fixed, and differs from individual to individual, to which claim we are rather accustomed after Jung. The epistemological intuitive undercurrent underlies cognition necessarily, but psychologically often passes undetected and undeveloped. What seems, on the other hand, impossible is, not intuition itself but the achievement to combine the «clarity» characterizing the separate clear-cut «sensa», or concepts, with the dimension available in inutition: we have either the one, or the other, not both.

[39] *Ibid.* 265.

I am of course not thinking of Jung's personal unconscious, and not even of the concept of the collective unconscious, but solely of what he calls synchronicity[40], but what may as well be termed the cosmic unconscious.

Jung explored synchronicity for years, and he came to think that psychology could not afford to overlook this phenomenon. Along different ways, Jung came to the same realization as Marcel. Marcel's conclusion is:

> «There is a level where I and you cease to be two nuclei quite distinct from each other».

Jung's concluding formulae are as follows: «a unitary idea of being», «a thinking in terms of the whole», the «getting rid of the incommensurability between the observed and the observer». «Thinkability», he says, «is itself an idea that needs the most rigorous criticism», and the result of researches along these lines «would be a unity of being which would have to be expressed in terms of a new conceptual language».

Three main issues, which are of interest here, are consequently involved in Jung's standpoint: the reality of a universal substratum, a development of an adequate epistemology, and a possibility of an adequate language. (Jung adds also that there may be at least one more basic issue implied: «the synchronicity principle possesses properties that may help to clear up the body-soul problem»).

If the theme of the unconscious is involved at all, one wonders whether it is not the case that the third meaning of memory in Scotus[41] has also something to do with the notion of intuitive cognition, particularly on the intellectual level. But I am not discussing this problem in the present paper.

The handling of the intuitive cognition by Scotus and its implications seem to point out that there are more than one pattern underlying perceiving. The classification into the «public» and «private» data thus verifiable or not verifiable seems to be faulty. Since underlying patterns of perceiving differ, there may be aspects which are cognizable publicly but which are nevertheless by some perceived and by others not, and so are quasi-private.

[40] JUNG C. G., *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, London 1955.
[41] *Rep.* I d. 3 q. 4 n. 8 (ed. VIVÈS XXII 103).

Seeing the world through the pattern of «a quidditical subject + qualities», or through the pattern of «objects and their thereness» are only certain ways of perceiving it, another being perceiving the world through the pattern of «real universality + diverse haecceitates».

Researches carried by A. Ames led him to the conclusions compatible with the above implications. It is as if for our convenience we created «objects» as shorthand forms of reference. We have developed «thereness» and «whatness» of what we perceive without taking into account the actually inherent higher order of significances. We ourselves have created the «objective» aspects of reality in order that we could develop physically and behave more effectively, but not *in order that we may know and experience reality* for the sake of knowing and experiencing. There may be other things to be perceived which lie dormant until we direct attention to them. Only registered significances can be brought into awareness [42].

Ames's conclusions point out that there are different principles of organization in perceiving, not only with reference to clearcut «sensa» but also with reference to patterns themselves and that an undogmatic flexibility of attitude towards these principles is the disposition of a knower, not of a faber.

The error of taking one favoured principle of organization as the only valid principle is pointed out by other contemporary writers as well. For example, A. Korzybski, who himself noticed it, underlines the awareness of the same in Whitehead:

«The subject-predicate habits of thought had been impressed on the European mind by the overemphasis on Aristotle's logic during the long mediaeval period» [43].

Subject qualified by predicate «may be seen as a trap set by the syntax of language» [44]. This orientation, comments Korzybski, makes «unbiased observations impossible». He comes forth with a thesis that there are more than one mode of observing:

[42] AMES A., Jr., *Reconsideration of the Origin and Nature of Perception*, in *Vision and Action. Essays in honor of H.M. Kallen*, 1953.
[43] WHITEHEAD A. N., *Process and Reality*, 80-81, quoted by A. KORZYBSKI, *The Role of Language in the Perceptual Process*, (*Perception, An Approach to Personality*, R. R. BLACKE & G. V. RAMSEY, New York 1951).
[44] WHITEHEAD A. N., *The Principle of Relativity with Applications to Physical Science*, *quoted ibid.*

«There is a tremendous difference between 'thinking' in verbal terms, and 'contemplating', inwardly silent, on non-verbal levels and *then* searching for the proper structure of language...».

This phenomenon of perceiving different aspects of the same object is discussed by Wittgenstein, but with reference to the clearcut sensa only [45]. However, the five important features of perceiving aspects noticed by Wittgenstein can be applied, too, to perceiving aspects dependent on different in patterns principles of organization. 1) There are different categories between «objects» of sight, for example, green colour, likeness. 2) One can see that a thing has not changed, and yet start to see it differently, which is noticing an aspect. 3) There is a difference between «continuous seeing» of an aspect and the «dawning» of an aspect. 4) Two different aspects may be congruent, though have no similarity. 5) The expression of a change of aspect is the expression of a new perception and at the same time of the perception's being unchanged.

There is, however, something less convincing in Wittgenstein's contention that I do not say myself «I see it as...», only others can say so of me; apparently because it is they who may at the same time see it as another aspect. Now this does not seem convincing because I myself can also see «the same» thing successively under different aspects, and I may even remember that aspect while seeing this, and perhaps may even retain the two simultaneously. There may be no dogmatism about «knowing» of something as such. The fact that I «know» it as a fork may be realized with no dogmatism about it, so that one does not have to «take it for» a fork automatically, which Wittgenstein seems to say one must. It is precisely this automatism or routine which may in one's consciousness be broken. «Taking things for» meaning something on the basis of their function may become as undogmatic as taking them for something else while not referring to the particular conventional function. If I say «now it is a fork» it does not have to be unintelligible, I may allude to its being used by someone for a different purpose from that for which the fork is most often used, I may allude to its not being a fork while it was still unshaped metal, to its being shaped before as something

[45] WITTGENSTEIN L., *Philosophical Investigations*, 1963, part 2 section 11.

meant for another function, to its being a mass of metal consisting of yet other unfit-for-fork purposes ingredients, to its being a metal still in a gaseous consistency, to its being a mass of dispersed atoms contained functionally in yet other «parts» of space. A stone might have been once used as a seat, then a broken part of it as a missile, then it could have been turned into gravel, now it may be an ingredient in the surface of a highway. This table was before a part of a tree.

Under the influence of an aim, perception at a certain stage dissolves the reality into object and subject, the bridge is supplied abstractively, transconductiveness of the object is lost. The intuitive mode of perceiving from the angle of the real universality and diverse «haecceitates» rediscovers the concatenation of the object in its totality, as a massive whole. If elicited psychologically, the correspondent experience may well be one of immensity and depth.

When the mechanism of retentions in the structure of perceiving is joint to the intransitive attention concentrated on the phases of the individual object as existing, this stimulates the intellectual intuitive mechanism of perceiving fusions. Phases which are now perceived as indisseverably fused in minute retentions may, in a flash, disclose themselves as fused with the further antecedent phases, even those which had not actually been perceived before by the same individual as final in the chain. Both the emission and the reception post reach back indefinitely in their antecedent phases, but reflecting on this stratification in objects is different from actually perceiving objects intuitively *as* so stratified. When one perceives so, the intuitive mechanism penetrates the strata of fusions at various depths. Actually perceiving objects as so stratified may lead to a peculiar sort of intuitive «induction». If a number of objects have been intuited in that degree of involving a stratum identical with that of the perceiver, then this facilitates the psychological situation in which any object perceived may release in the funded perception the content of the commune reale inhering in any other object as well. Thus, on the same level, there may occur also intuitive perceptually-intellectual version of «recognition» of the fused stratum, again parallel to the recognition of places, objects, qualities on the abstractive level of inference, «sensa», and memories.

Developed intellectual intuition penetrates into something which refuses to become atomic but is ultimately fused. The specious present loses its isolated character in this perception, because one is perceiving not from the side, for example, like a continuing line passing in the window and so perceived from the side, but from the inside, for example, as if one's focus of looking were a point at the end of a continuing batch of lines and the point were seeing «back» into a line, all of them converging at the root.

The subjective one-sidedness and the object's non-transconductiveness in perception are lost. One perceives the other from the point of view of being oneself the universe intuiting in this act partly also itself.

This is not at all merely like feeling or imagining or remembering the rest of the well known town while actually seeing one familiar sight of it (so called ultra-stimulus perception). The object becomes telescoped not only because the perception enfolds a great number of the presentational immediacy sensa collected in previous perceptions of the vicinities, but above all because it enfolds *a*) the perceived now antecedent phases, inhering fused within the derivative phases of the object as existing, and *b*) the antecendent phases of the object, not perceived earlier as isolated in the specious present.

This mode of the cognitive act takes place in the dim light of intuitive consciousness, because the mechanism of the mode arises not as rational inference from clear-cut separate «sensa» but as awareness stirred by knowing a fusion reaching the common roots of subject and object while attention concentrates intransitively on «this» cognitive object as existing.

In contradistinction to the manner of perceiving which is shaped by the utilitaristic aim and pragma in the factorial sense, by greed and deed, we may call the other mode of perceiving disinterestedly aesthetic. Aesthetic, not in any sense hostile to activity, nor in the sense in which Kierkegaard contrasts aesthetic and religious life, but in Adolph Portmann's sense, for whom there is a different significance from the utilitarian one in the antlers of the deer [46], and in the sense in which Eva Schaper con-

[46] PORTMANN A., *Die Gestaldeutung der Organismen*, 1955, quoted by WASMUTH E., *G. M. Hopkins' Aestetik*, in *Die Neue Rundschau* 66 (1955).

trasts two ways of perceiving: αἴσθησις means perception; to perceive aesthetically is to perceive «for no ulterior ends», it is to perceive for the sake of perceiving, when perception in the fullest sense is achieved and covers both conscious and unconscious experential contact with things[47]. Also in the sense in which H. Osborne opposes practical perception to aesthetic perception: in the latter the capacities themselves are vitalized and enlarged:

«In practical perception we observe the world seriatim, assembling a vast array of simple isolated observations which we then combine and relate by discursive reason».

Whereas

« the amplification of capacity does not consist in increasing the number or the rapidity of such discrete sensory contacts but in increasing the plenitude of awareness».

Only in this way, he says, can the total vitality of our being be enhanced by expanding the capacity of the faculties[48].

Our consciousness «extends», becomes amplified and invigorated, not when we are «thinking about» the past, but when we are intuiting the present *as* present.

Again, Heidegger interprets in a similar sense the meaning of knowing being, in the early Greek thought: a cognitive act which knows being as such does not exclude sense perception, is not passive but starts from careful attention directed to a presence, does not oppose subject and object, and so is not a conceptualization: it is grasping, it is «taking in» (hin-nehem) as one might take in a concert. When listening to Albinoni's Adagio for organ and string orchestra, there is eliminated from the structure of perception the function of recognizing a kind: all that is left is tracing «this».

II. - Prehensive perception in the twentieth century

As S. Day remarked, it was not easy for Scotus' contemporaries to understand and accept his conception of intuitive cognition. His theory was a step towards the view that there is no unbridgeable chasm between the knowing and the known. He gave new conception of the nature of the intellect.

[47] Schaper E., *Aesthetic Perception* (*The Relevance of Whitehead*, ed. I. Leclerc, London-New York1961).
[48] Osborne H., *Theory of Beauty*, London 1952.

Today, the barrier between the knowing and the known is being broken again, in the theoretical attempts of Teilhard de Chardin, Gabriel Marcel, Whitehead, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others. Scientists, on their part, like A. Ames, F. H. Allport, P. Schilder, Smythies, R. R. Blake and G. V. Ramsey show that what was taken for the immediate and given (or primary) in perception is the result of a very complex process of omission, suppression, selection, and emphasis.

It would be in vain to try and find in twentieth century thought the terminology which would remind us of Scotus' terms. But what can be found is the claim, a claim similar to the one he made. The claim is that we do have an access to a type of cognition which Duns Scotus tried to distil and analyse in its various ramifications. And so there are now renewed attempts seen at forging out an adequate theory of this type of cognition.

I am not arguing that the twentieth century has come to some definite and ultimate discoveries or methods in epistemology which would constitute the last word in this field. But there are attempts to handle perception anew, which do seem hopeful, in their broadmindedness, in their honest effort to take into account all that does occur in different perceptions, and which do resemble the efforts of Duns Scotus.

What is taken up in the twentieth-century philosophy seems to be the following: 1) The claim that there is more to perception than the *a* data; 2) The claim that there are two different species of percepts; 3) The claim that the *b* data include the percepts of derivativeness; 4) Interconnectedness.

The claim is anti-Humean: it is not true that the only data in perception are spatial relations of coloured patches. There is something more primary available in perception (beyond and over the *a* data) which can be elicited: again, not which is as a rule elicited, but which *can* be elicited. This is what I call a neo-Scotist claim in our century.

Let us quote first what Hume says:

«My senses convey to me only the impressions of coloured points, disposed in a certain manner. If the eye is sensible of anything further, I desire it may be pointed out to me»[49].

[49] Hume D., *Treatise*, bk. I part 2 section 3.

The reply is: if we take Hume's analysis as limited to the *a* data only, Hume is right. But taken as total analysis of perception Hume's views are grossly inadequate. The *a* data are sometimes called now presentational immediacy; the data of the other type are called causal efficacy.

It is further argued that Hume's theory of causation depends on his theory of perception; but his theory of perception is inadequate; and consequently his analysis of causation is inadequate.

Both Hume and Kant took presentational immediacy for the primary fact of perception. But the clearness in consciousness is no evidence for primitiveness in the genetic process; the opposite doctrine is more nearly true. It has been usual to assume the primacy of this clear and distinct perception of qualities of sights, sounds, tastes, on the basis of which we then draw conclusions; but this is wrong.

According to Hume, we respond only to presentational immediacy and to nothing else. However, the truth is that this in not the sole source of information. For example, the flash of light made the man's eyes blink. His percepts were the flash, and also the blink, but according to some, also the percept of the flash *making* him blink. The first to assert this would be the man who blinked. He will say he does experience the « making ». All the three are percepts, on the anti-Humean theory, but not in one mode of perceiving. If the flash were very strong, the visual sensum would be to some extent spoilt, but the percept of the force, of the strength of the impact which made him blink would even come to the fore instead.

The notion of causation, it is further argued, arose because mankind lives and experiences in the mode of causal efficacy.

Hume maintains that the causal « feeling » arises from the long association of well-marked presentations of sensa, one precedent to the other. But if so, it would seem that inhibitions of sensa in presentational immediacy should be accompanied by a corresponding absence of causal «feeling»: however, the contrary is the case. An inhibition of familiar sensa is very apt to leave us in expectancy of vague causal operations in the environment. For example, there are vague influences pressing upon us in the dark; in the silence the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself upon us:

«In the vagueness of the low hum of insects in an August woodland, the inflow into ourselves of influences from enveloping nature overwhelms us» [50].

Even when there are no clear sensa, we are sensitive to vague awareness of influence: the percepts may be vague as to spatial and temporal definition but dominant in experience. And unfamiliar sensa may be perceived as conveying causal influence very strongly.

Hume's doctrine tries in fact to invert the relationship between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy by making causal efficacy as an experience dependent upon presentational immediacy, but this is not based on any appeal to experience. Hume ignores the presence of any primary strata in perception.

Another example shows that we are aware of causal transitions: in listening to the words « the United States » when we hear «united» we are urged to complete the phrase «states», and this element « states » is not an isolated sense datum but part of a previous state from which the present moment is an outgrowth.

The argument against Hume is, on the one hand, that we have developed to a very high degree the process of selection, omission, emphasis, and suppression acting in the genesis of the perceptual process, for the sake of all sorts of utilitarian purposes, which makes for the « non-neutrality » of sensa, and that there is a more primary stratum. On the other hand, that we influence perception by our ideas about time. There is no lapse of empty time in itself. The idea of empty time, mere succession without any contents of happening, is only an abstraction with no foundation in reality. On this theory, the scientific concepts of space and time are considered the first outcomes of the simplest generalization from experience. It is a generalization of the deep immediate contact of our being with the interconnectedness of everything, of each being with the rest.

The perception of temporal passage of the object is absent in the traditional empiricist scheme, but according to some philosophers today we directly perceive temporal passage. The perceiver can perceive his own passage as well. Our anger can be observed as welling up from the immediate past into immediate future. We

[50] WHITEHEAD A. N., *Process and Reality*.

notice today that also in introspection we most often neglect percepts in the causal efficacy mode.

The sense of our derivation may be easily missed when we try to compare two points divided by a longer interval, we may not perceive even how today is derived from yesterday, but when the two points are separated by the shortest possible time we directly perceive this interlocking. Also we can perceive the reactions, the influences, the transformative pressure of other actualities on ourselves. Phases are transforming into phases something of the antedecent ones remaining in the following ones.

The examples which are inconvenient for the narrow view of perception represented by the Humean type of theory are being supplied by twentieth-century writers on all sides, both in philosophy and literature. It seems as if we were trying to be difficult and awkward in a protest against cutting life according to the theories. (And we often come to the modest conclusion that perhaps the best what we can achieve at all is a descriptive analysis of perception).

There is a great fuss going on in the attempt to analyse and understand how we perceive music. Perceiving separate successive sounds is of no use here. «Past» phases as inhering and actually perceived in the present derivative ones seem to be the basis of the experience. Noticing time alone disappears, we do not notice for how long we have been listening when we are experiencing music attentively. (Wittgenstein calls this the only eternity accessible to us: to be wholly in the present). We are noticing the object itself.

Past phases as inhering in the present derivative ones seem to be perceived in a variety of contexts. Some vegetarians do not eat meat not only « on principle » but because of some experience actually involved in the perception: while looking at the meat or tasting it, some perceive the texture or flavour of meat as the derivative phase of a dying animal, and can't swallow the food. (I am thinking of instances which are different from merely imaginative amplification). In the smell of cooked pork one can discern a streak of the smell of a living animal. In the flavour of meat cooked or fried in a certain way one can discern, often close to the bone, the taste of blood, the taste known to one and thus recognizable as the taste in one's own blood, remembered from

the experience of having one's tooth extracted. One can see a leather shoe as a derivative phase from the phase of a dying animal.

It is possible for some to discern in the smell of the dog's coat, on a frosty day, or in the rain, the streak of the smell of a pine tree exhaled in the warm room in Winter. The woollen blanket when damp with rain has a shade of a living animal smell. When one touches the sleeve of a woollen cardigan one may discern among the perceptual data of touch also the percept of a feel of something animal, and among the visual data, in spite of its colour, the hairy and downy texture of a living animal's coat.

Looking at a dog's coat one may discern in the arrangement of the streaks the pattern of the arrangement of water waves, of bushes, of tree-needles, and of feathers. Looking at a man's hair we may perceive the consistency of fur, of feathers, of grass, and the patterns of streaming whirls of water, patterns on the sand made by wind or water, patterns of erosion, patterns of the sun's flames photographed or interstellar gas in the telescopic photographs.

When having one's eyes shut it is not easy for the stroking fingers to distinguish by touch the texture of a dog's coat from a bird's.

Wittgenstein gives the following instance of a recognition:

«I meet someone whom I have not seen for years; I see him clearly, but fail to know him. Suddenly I know him, I see the old face in the altered one».

The past phase is actually elicited within the present derivative one.

Many inconvenient examples concern the perception of personality. There would be a number of passages to quote from Gabriel Marcel, and from some outstanding novelists. To this category belongs also the example supplied by the passage about the recognition on the road to Emmaus. The problem of knowing persons is taken up with profound precision and insight by Prof. R. L. Saw [51].

[51] SAW R. L., *Our Knowledge of Individuals*, in *Proceeding of the Aristotelian Society* 52 (1951-1952). Cf. also her lecture *Persons* delivered at the Royal Institute of Philosophy on the 16th Oct. 1964. The point in knowing individuals is not certainty, she remarks, but adequacy. Methods and results of natural sciences ought not to influence the ways of knowing individuals.

We notice today that « a complex experience which includes conscious attention to individuality unlooses a wealth of feeling far beyond anything derived from patterns of sensa merely as such » [52]. We find an admission that individuality is the backbone of strong experience [53]. In this type of perception the mind is pressing towards « it » as divorced from the sense pattern alone, divorced from the qualitative aspects at the moment presented [54]. This type of perceiving is at the base of deep affection, at the base of the love of particular objects, or works of art. But what is more, it is not a peculiarity of mankind alone, it is also detectable in animals:

«A dog smells in order to find out if the person in question is that 'it' to which its affections cling. The room, or stable, or saucepan may be full of odours, many of which may be for a dog sweeter. But he is not smelling for the pleasure of that smell, but to discover that 'it' who claims his whole affection» [55].

This type of interest in perception refers to the ingredients accessible in perception which are beyond sense pattern alone in Humean sense. The insight of the poet, even as far back in history as Homer, was deep enough not to miss this. When after nineteen years Odysseus comes back home, his own family do not recognize him. But

«Stretched on the ground close to where they stood talking there lay a dog, who now pricked up his ears and raised his head. Argus was his name. Odysseus himself had owned him and trained him... But now, in his owner's absence, he lay abandoned on the heaps of dung... But directly he became aware of Odysseus' presence, he wagged his tail and dropped his ears» [56].

Wittgenstein notices that we can perceive a shape either as a duck or as a rabbit. However, perhaps a shift is possible not with reference to the spatial configuration only. And if perception does contain this other dimension of a duck-rabbit possibility, then indeed it seems that much of contemporary philosophy must re-examine its basic presuppositions. This is the conclusion reached

[52] WHITEHEAD A. N., *Adventures of Ideas*, 280.
[53] *Ibid.* 263.
[54] *Ibid.* 261.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] HOMER, *The Odyssey*, transl. by E. V. RIEU, Penguin 1965, 266.

by Whitehead whose theory I am here propounding in the neo-Scotist light. After all, perhaps «we find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough» (Wittgenstein).

It is Whitehead who even talks of rather disregarding the sense pattern in order to concentrate attention on the reality of derivativeness accessible to perception, and on the grip of individuality on it. According to him, it is possible to perceive a grey stone *as* not grey.

These *b* data which are within perception besides the *a* data constitute for him what he calls the « non-sensuous » perception [57]. And he says: « the tacit identification of perception with sense-perception only must be a fatal error barring the advance of systematic metaphysics » [58].

Whitehead develops his doctrine of perception mainly in *Process and Reality, Adventures of Ideas, The Concept of Nature* and *Symbolism*. Whitehead starts from the remark that what we consider the average everyday perception is really « symbolic reference ». This term signifies a fusion of two different modes of perceiving. The distinction between these two modes is based on two different species of percepts. These two modes have quite unique functions and purposes; the type of their advantages is different.

There is an interplay between the two modes of perceiving, and the unravelling of this complex is very important for the theory of perception. Usually one mode is hidden behind the other; but they can be distinguished. We are used to registering in consciousness certain elements and to not registering others. Presentational immediacy is the result of unusual concentration upon certain elements in the environment, namely clear-cut separate sensa ad spatio-temporal factors. This mode concerns such percepts as taste, colours, sounds, configurations, and only as contemporaneous, i.e. with no reference to a living connection with the past phases. And this is all that the traditional empiricist account meant by perception. Presentational immediacy then can be defined as an apprehension of the spatio-temporal geometrical character of the contem-

[57] WHITEHEAD, *Adventures of Ideas*, 182.
[58] *Ibid.*

porary world apart from the « prehensive » structure of reality as existing.

The law that Whitehead emphasizes is that the elements from later phases of evolution are more clearly illuminated by consciousness than the primary elements. To neglect this law is fatal to the proper analysis of perception. The vague elements fail to win our attention precisely because our attention is most often captured by the clarity and definiteness, by the superficial brightness which we get in the sensa in the Humean sense:

«Sensa in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' are abstracted from the basic, confused, encountered contact, selected and brought into consciousness» [59].

Whitehead is of the opinion that in general Greeks did not bother about the origins of perception. They started from perception in its most elaborated and sophisticated form, namely, visual perception of geometrical relations. They never asked whether in this product there were still deeper originative elements to be traced.

Scotus' opinion was somewhat different. It seemed to him that such men as Parmenides could have an intuitive intellectual vision of something existing as existing, in its primary reference to the « commune reale », which is the most primary stratum of the intellectual intuition, without being able to identify the whatness [60].

Whitehead says, that the most primitive element which strikes our perceptual awareness is that « something is going on ».

It is maintained on this theory that in perception there is epistemologically included in the data, not only our perceptive reaction - say, by a colour - but also our more primary receptive reaction to the forms of energy received, apart from the act of distinguishing separate colours, etc. Entities impress themselves upon the perceiver in their full completeness, in their concrescence which is indefinable. We receive this message apart from the message being caught into the old linguistic ruts, socio-culturally trained

[59] SCHAPER, *op. cit.*

[60] A somewhat similar standpoint, with all the difference of the twentieth-century context, is argued for by HAMPSHIRE, *Identification and Existence*, in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Third Series, ed. H. D. LEWIS, London-New York 1956.

and neurologically canalized patterns of representation inherited from bygone generations.

What we perceive in an instant is in fact something more than an idea of an instant would allow for, and this « something more » includes also this immediate present embraced in an instant.

An entity is the concrescence and the issue of the indefinite number of the elements entering into it in the past. And perception in its primary form concerns this, it is the consciousness of the causal efficacy of the environment. Through causal efficacy we have an access to, a contact with the full reality of an object, we have a contact with the thing as really related to the universe. And if the perceiver's awareness lends itself to this fullness, he realizes that the content is massive in all its derivative, real relatedness. This other mode of perception is concerned with the massive presence of the « past », i.e. the presence, not of time but of the preceding phases of some ingredients in beings, which are through changes retained and thus inhere in these beings. To Whitehead there is no such thing as human experience at an instant. Instants are only abstractions. In causal efficacy the first fundamental element perceived is that something of the past is having an effect upon the perceiver. Knowledge, he says, is the reciprocal insistence between the perceiver and the rest of nature.

The primary factor is the experiential togetherness, while the spatio-temporal contours are only one of the factors accessible for the perceptual awareness. In the mode of causal efficacy we perceive the object vaguely as participating in the universal interconnectedness. Whitehead's concrescence of ingredients is very near to Scotus' fusion of formalities.

Whitehead defines nature by saying « nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses» [61]. The so called properties themselves of things are the signals of their real relatedness to other things. When the perceived duration is lifted from its vague immediate past into distinctness so that it is precipitated upon the representative regions in the contemporary present, then we may say that the sensations are « projected ». The contemporary sensa are something donated from the mode of causal efficacy and «projected» on to the area. Thus the percepts supplied by presen-

[61] WHITEHEAD A. N., *The Concept of Nature*, 3.

tational immediacy are used as symbols for percepts supplied by causal efficacy (not vice versa). They are related as symbol and meaning; hence the mixed mode may be called symbolic reference. When the percept from one species evokes its correlate in the other species, we have symbolic reference. Symbolic reference starts with the symbol, and ends with the meaning. For example, the coloured shape itself, presented to sight is used as the symbol of the actual person, and the perception of the coloured shape blends itself with the perception of actual being which is given in the mode of causal efficacy.

What happens is that in average perception in most cases we make no distinction between the coloured shape and the actual person. But the coloured shape is not the person. The person is what we perceive in quite different species of percepts. The percept of *a* type is a representative, in distinct separate terms, of what is perceived vaguely - but deeply - in the *b* type of percepts. It is vague above all from the point of view of any reference to spatial contours, because the spatial pattern is the domain of presentational immediacy. Percepts in presentational immediacy have the minimum of reference to derivativeness or to future. And it may very well be that what is important in causal efficacy may be less important in presentational immediacy, and vice versa.

In general it most often happens that adjectives refer to information from the mode of presentational immediacy, and nouns refer to dim percepts in the mode of causal efficacy. When we register in consciousness the quality «grey», and we add to it «stone», we mean something more than the group of qualities: this rescued contemporaneous region of space is real only together with a certain historic route[42], with its incalculable continuation backwards which unavoidably does linger in it. For Whitehead, the element of meaning is likely to be derived from causal efficacy, which seems to be also what Scotus maintains with reference to intuitive cognition, according to S. Day. The data of the presentational immediacy mode, says Whitehead, are «barren»: the significant aspects of nature are accessible in the causal efficacy mode. He says that « grey » in itself conveys so little that this sort of per-

[42] WHITEHEAD, *Process and Reality*, 261.

cepts led to Descartes' definition of substance as requiring nothing in order to exist, and to his notion of extension as the attribute of a genus of substances. It also led to Hume's notion of «impression of sensations» arising from unknown sources and in complete independence. But the presentational immediacy data just rescue a certain region from its confusion with other regions, while by the word « stone » we try to point to something more, to derivativeness, to the « having existed » within an individuality. Thus, says Whitehead, if we concentrate on the latter species of percepts, it is possible to perceive a grey stone as not grey.

Presentational immediacy deals with the same object as causal efficacy. However, it does not deal with reality of the object in its wholeness as it exists and as it forces itself upon the perceiver. The two modes deal with the same object but under different proportions of relevance.

In presentational immediacy we perceive only that contemporary events happen independently of the events with which they are contemporary: presentational immediacy does not display things as conditioned by the extensiveness into a common past.

In causal efficacy, on the other hand, locus is indistinctly perceived. The detailed geometrical relationships are vague, particular regions are not distinguishable, because, for this mode, something else comes into the fore, something else moves into the focus of awareness. The influence is felt as localized and yet as evading local definition, and what is summarized in this, says Whitehead, is the sense of existence.

The world is not just extensive in the present as spatial, but it is also extensive, as it were, « backwards », in its atemporal aspect. Spatial location is merely an instance pointing to a deeper interconnectedness, to participation in the atemporal interconnectedness.

To causal efficacy belong such percepts as the percept of something being derived, of passage to an immediate future, of influx of influence from other presences, of belonging to oneself in the past and in the present, that is of belonging to oneself but also of belonging to something more vast. Various chemical, vegetative, sensitive phases of successive developments partly overlap in the past. There are various causal pasts, that is, various « actual worlds », and they cannot be identical, yet partly there is an over-

lapping of the pasts, and so the past is partly identical both for the perceiver and for the object perceived. Thus in the mode of causal efficacy there is a perception of the antecedency which is causally efficacious both for the percipient and for the object.

The functioning of the body of the perceiver by sensa represents in itself the influence of the more remote past. The animal body of the perceiver is going back indefinitely into the past of the world. It is at least at these « lower » levels that the elements on both sides, as it were « recognize » one another in atemporal coexistence. What is a sensum in presentational immediacy comes from a very complex multiple integration of concrescence both within the object perceived and within the perceiver. Whitehead holds that the discussion of knowledge must involve a synthesis of the knower and the known. As he says, perception takes place from within nature. In this sense the perceiver experiences the causal influences which moulded the presented locus, the influences to which this locus was subjected, and which inhere in it, whether it is greenness, or a woodern chair, or a flower, or an animal, or a man, or a work of art.

Causal efficacy is a factor operative throughout all nature. We observe some such behaviour even in the inorganic world. Thus we must assign the mode of causal efficacy to the most fundamental constitution of an entity: in germ it belongs even to the organisms of the lowest grade. There is every indication of their vague perceiving causal relationship with the environment, and in some cases, of intense perceiving, but vague as to locality. Lower beings show the same causal awareness - but what they lack is the distinctiveness of presentational immediacy.

But I have to go back again to Whitehead's stress on what he calls « prehensive » interconnectedness. It is not only in the physical sense that the perceiver is deriving indefinitely, but also in his mental concrescence. What Whitehead is referring to is a sort of metabolism of physical, psychological and spiritual type. Geometrical or mathematical concept of space and time is thus very different from the « extensive continuum » in the prehensive sense. Besides spatio-temporal perspectives in nature there is for Whitehead also the dimension of mental pole, the dimension of life, the dimension of value. Among fundamental percepts we may discern these also.

Whitehead holds that every sense perception involves, epistemologically, stimulation of the senses and intellect by a prehensive wealth of the object. The percepts of causal efficacy are elements in the ultimate texture of our experience. To be within the prehensive field of the object is the real and actual relation between the perceiver and the object.

However, for ordinary casual perception, psychologically, there is usually the fusion of the two modes, and not a symmetrical fusion, because the presentational immediacy data are usually in the fore, and they are sometimes the only data that we are taking into account. Nevertheless, it is possible, according to Whitehead, to catch the distinction between the two. But the relation between the two modes may be different in different individuals: some people may perceive rather in the one mode than in the other. Also, the integration of both can occur differently: they may be a subordination of the one or the other. Deep differences between individuals' view of the world, and their particular reactions to particular beings or events or values, may be to some extent accounted for in this way.

Absolutely pure perception in one of these modes it not very often; however, it does occur. Each mode is intrinsically capable of direct recognition.

Sometimes it is a particular arrangement of the pattern of sensa (as it is for example in art) which helps to elicit the other mode of perceiving. On the other hand, it may happen also that when the sense pattern is receding this brings the relief for the perceptual field and thus makes room for the data from the other mode to emerge and flow into the field. For example, says Whitehead, when we are falling asleep; or, as in Scotus, when one « surgit a somno »[6].

The former point has been taken up by Eva Shaper who shows how the distinction between presentational immediacy and

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[6] S. Hampshire notices only that when we are awakening, we have sensations alone, without being aware of our situation in the world (HAMPSHIRE S., *Thought and Action*, 1959, 59). On Scotus' or on Whitehead's theory one would have to add that on this border line between the conscious and the unconscious, apart from bare sensations there may already be active at the same time a prehensive organizing principle of pattern underlying perceiving.

causal efficacy can be of importance in aesthetics. But the first attempt in this direction was made by G. M. Hopkins under the direct influence of Scotus' thought.

On the contrary, classifications into species in natural sciences, and classificatory philosophical systems, are derived from presentational immediacy data alone. Individuals, as Whitehead says, are irrelevant to scientific observations [64]. Thus the difference between presentational immediacy and causal efficacy is ultimately so great that one can summarise the view based on the causal efficacy data in the words of G. M. Hopkins:

«Self can in every object see another self, personal or not, and can treat any one thing how great or small soever as equal to any other thing how great or small soever».

As Whitehead says, apart from the scientific type of perception, individuality is the backbone of strong experience.

The basic intuitive perception may thus stand at the roots of a standpoint in philosophy, and of an ethical behaviour in practical life. These may be called, respectively, metaphysics of humility and ethics of reverence for life. « Self can treat any other self as equal » is at the heart of the reverence for life in the Schweitzerian morality, while an intuition of the metaphysical equality running through all the structures in the universe (« commune reale », universal nature, « haecceitas ») is at the heart of the metaphysics of humility underlying the ethics of reverence.

But as to the question whether this undercurrent of causal efficacy can be recovered so as to be lifted up into clearer and distinct consciousness, Whitehead's reply is that only vague consciousness of this can be experienced. If S. Day says that « Scotus' assertion that we do not experience intuitive cognition as certainly as abstractive may sound strange to modern ears » [65], it certainly wouldn't sound strange to Yhitehead. He says: causal efficacy is vague, confused, indistinct, but massive, objective, uncontrollable. It cannot be elicited into clear-cut concepts, it retains its massiveness, heaviness, non-excludability. It retains its, as it were, « down-the-tube-perspective ». It is too rich and vast to be trapped into compartments.

[64] WHITEHEAD, *Process and Reality*.
[65] DAY, *op. cit.*, 50.

According to Whitehead, the content is so devoid of horizons that the only thing that holds this immensity together is individuality, the backbone of strong experience. If we do not take into account this, he says, « if we forget this background » (to sensa), « the result is triviality » [65bis].

III. - CONCLUSION

It seems undeniable that both Scotus and Whitehead are groping to find a correspondent theoretical coherence for the same aspect noticed in perceiving which, however, seems indeed difficult to be tackled theoretically and finally pinned down.

We have the following links to think about. First of all, let us confine ourselves to the subject of perceiving aspects, which interested Wittgenstein. But instead of contrasting only a duck and a rabbit, we shall allow also for the contrast of aspects between something perceived as a specimen and something perceived as actually existing and present.

Then, we have a concept of the perceived fusion, first, on the level of presentational immediacy alone, which perception occurs, for instance, in music above all (but Dewey and Pepper [66] discuss it with reference to other arts also). This already refers to the mechanism of perceiving something as actually existing: a temporal continuity and some sameness accessible through the mechanism of retention.

Next, Scotism has coined the concept of a fused being, of the fused actuality of the individual, that of atemporal duration. Whitehead's concrescence - ingredients regrouping in the outcome of an evolutionary process - corresponds to the scotistic idea of fusion.

And they both try to argue that this aspect is accessible to cognition: one uses the term of the « visio naturae exsistentis ut exsistens », the other that of the causal efficacy mode. Merleau-Ponty's unstability of the perceptual horizon, Jung's movable threshold of consciousness, and Prof. R. L. Saw's discussion on persons are on the side of such a contention.

[65bis] WHITEHEAD A. N., *Modes of Thought*, 147.
[66] PEPPER S., *The Work of Art*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1955.

The cognizability of the causal efficacy aspect would imply that something like the mechanism of corresponding retention would have to be stimulated as the adequate tool to cope with the complexity and extensiveness of such cognitive object. This retention would no longer refer to sensa alone but would have to be also highly intellectual; however, of the nature of an intuitive flash, developing while dwelt on but devoid of either definable concepts or discursive reasoning.

One may ask, what stimulus might be adequate to evoke that mechanism of perceiving fusion on the level of causal efficacy?

Here the question arises, whether aesthetic perceiving is not par excellence the manner of perceiving fusions as fusions, on both levels. Music, the beauty of animals and of landscapes are examples of such a stimulus. So that the peculiarity of the aesthetic presentational immediacy as distinct from presentational immediacy in general is its ability to evoke causal efficacy together with it. To give account for aesthetic experience in terms of presentational immediacy alone is not sufficient.

When we are considering successively the attempts made and conclusions reached by a number of writers in the aesthetic field[67], we notice that through the clarification of ideas in discussion and criticism there occurs a gradual approach towards the point which finally faces, on the other bank, the achievement of Scotus and Whitehead in metaphysics and epistemology.

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[67] KAHLER E., *What is Art*, in *Problems in Aesthetics*, ed. M. WEITZ, New York 1959; POLE D., *What makes a situation aesthetic?*, in PASS 31 (1957-1958); MARGOLIS J., *Aesthetic Perception*, in *Journal of Aesthetics*, 19 (1960); VIVAS E., TOMAS V., *Aesthetic Vision*, in *Philosophical Review* 68 (1959); *The Problems of Aesthetics*, Introduction, ed. VIVAS and KRIEGER, New York 1956; *A Definition of Aesthetic Experience*, in *Journal of Philosophy* 34 (1937); *The Dehumanization of Art*, Garden City, N.Y., 1956; ORTEGA Y GASSET, phenomenological discussions, for instance, as summarized by TYMIENIECKA A.-T., *Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Thought*, New York 1962; HAMPSHIRE S., *Logic and Appreciation*, in *Aesthetics and the Language*, ed. W. ELTON, Oxford 1959; WHITEHEAD A. N., *Science and the Modern World*, ch. 13; CROWE RANSOM J., *The Mimetic Principle and Our Cathartic Principle* (The World's Body), New York 1938; SAW R.L., *Knowledge of Individuals*, in PASS 52 (1951-1952), also her lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in October, 1964, on *Persons*; PEPPER, *op. cit.*; LANGER S., *Problems of Art*, in *Book of Aesthetics*, ed. M. RADER, New York 1965; SHERBURNE D., *A Whiteheadian Aesthetics*, New Haven 1961; SCHAPER E., *Aesthetic Perception* (*The Relevance of Whitehead*, ed. I. LECLERC, London 1961).

The result of the considerations in my paper is that the Scotist and the Neo-Scotist intuitive act of cognition (which is both sensuous and intellectual) stands for the ability to perceive fusions as fusions.

The basic grades of perceiving the content as fused are three:

1) The object is perceived through retention in its bare temporal fusion: at each temporal section as the final phase of an identity continuing.

2) The object's presentational immediacy is perceived at each temporal section as the outcome of co-present influences of the accompanying colours or of the antecedent sounds.

3) The object is perceived, at any temporal section, as the outcome of derivatively co-present prehensions, i.e. of other than the abstractively taken presentational immediacy influences alone, fused in a man, in a tree, in art.

There can be distinguished various densities of fusions perceived. The intuitive perception has various degrees of approximation to its ultimate possibilities, as also abstraction has. Thus, for example, the sequence in music is fused in such and not in another manner (style, tone-colour), with such and such character of ideas, images, or emotions involved because of the derivativeness both of the instruments themselves and of the artist's personality, fused with each aspect of his choice. There are not only sounds alone fused: the case is that whatever more comes into the density of the fusion from the material itself and from the mentality of the artist constitutes what is called prehensive derivativeness, and this is fused with the sound as taken abstractively alone. There are the artist's psychology, personality, and his bodily conditioning - highly derivative in themselves - as well as the sounds being derivative themselves: instruments being derivative in regard to wood, animals, metal, etc., and in regard to people who made them, that primary stuff being again derivative further back; sounds again being derivative in regard not only to the instruments and the artist's personality but also to the derivativeness of the perceiver's organism and mentality. Sounds as taken abstractively alone, in the same way as a piece of painted canvas or a spatially located physical body of the sculpture may be taken, are only one of the factors involved in a complex prehensive structure. The full

totality of the aesthetic situation is the whole prehensive field. Musical composition is a fused history whose presentational immediacy also is fused, by the unshareable identity which continues and so makes the whole derivative density of the prehensive fusion conspicuous. Thus the impact on the recipient is immensely concatenated and multiplied.

That derivativeness then is channelled from the three immense sources: the artist, the artist's whole material, and the recipient. The richer the derivativeness in any of the channels, the richer is the aesthetic perception; so the experience based on it is also bound to become richer. Whether it does become so, is in the last instance conditioned by the recipient's psychology and adequate training.

Thus bare presentational immediacy is but an ingredient within the density of the aesthetic fusion. Elementary sensa («discriminanda schemes») in the developing aesthetic intuition lend themselves as fused with their derivative antecedency and with the individual identity - and so they ultimately, as it were, unfuse, «disintegrate» in the experience, thus showing the universe through and thus no longer remaining atomic themselves.

Whitehead maintains that within the presentational immediacy sensa of the work of art there obtains a correspondence to the organization of reality itself which, on his theory, is prehensive wealth organized by the individual identity in existents. He calls it an adequate relation of appearance to reality[68]. I call this structure in art transconductive.

The mode of knowing fusion as fusion, though of its nature belongs basically to the epistemological structure of knowing anything as actually existing, does not always become fully developed in consciousness. Not only the structure of the act does not always become the object of introspection, but also its content - the structure of the actually existing being released in such an act - does not always become registered consciously. Often, too, memories or all sorts of associations connected with the perceived object may be a distracting factor and may be themselves taken, by mistake, for the fused content.

[68] WHITEHEAD, *Adventures of Ideas.*

Nevertheless, perceiving fusion does occur in some paradigm cases of conscious experience, as it is argued by S. Pepper[69]. Pepper reminds us of the attempts made in the past to attack this phenomenon. The attempts were made by W. James, Bergson, Croce, Bosanquet - even as early as by Baumgarten - and of course by Dewey. Pepper himself tries to give the analysis of fusion and funding as much precision as possible. For example, he shows that the apparent inconsistencies in Dewey's handling of the subject are not really inconsistencies (for instance, discrimination and non-discriminative intuiting of the fused content do not occur at the same time; reasoning about knowing fusion may show that this implies knowing that it is unfusable, i.e. as constituted of the derivative ingredients going back indefinitely in the course of the physical and mental concrescence - but in the actual act of intuiting fusion the character of the content depends precisely on the overwhelming massiveness which remains undissected conceptually).

Pepper admits that Dewey writes sometimes impressionistically. But, he says, the emergence of a new concept can perhaps be indicated only in some such way. Pepper agrees that the elements are not only those immediately present in the focus of conscious attention, but also those that come from any area of the fringe, and even from sources outside of what can be brought to conscious attention. Pepper helpfully distinguishes the cluster of concepts of fusion (nine possibilities) which refer to various elements or ingredients available to perception as fused. He also remarks that perceiving fusion is a process which always has some duration and may spread over an extended period. The content intuited imposes itself with ultimate immediacy, and in this sense is « indescribable ». Sight is less disposed to perceiving fusion, hearing and taste most disposed of all the senses, according to Pepper.

Pepper's exhaustive analysis of fusion and funding is useful in its precision. He does not, however, speak about an intellectual development of perceiving fusion. And what he leaves without a proper comment is the sufficient distinguishing of the fusion in terms of actual perceiving from its interpretation in terms of memory.

[69] PEPPER, *op. cit.*

Funding does involve « elements coming out of the past »[70], as Pepper rightly remarks. However, this does not imply that these must be merely remembered elements associated.

Musical composition, heard even for the first time, is already heard as fused, while the town sight seen for the first time does not at once coalesce at all in the same sense as music does. The so called ultra-stimulus perception of the town is indeed based simply on memories associated, like, for example, the ultra-stimulus perception of the telephone behind my back.

Once the mechanism of perceiving fusion is admitted at all, there is no logical reason for denying that a development of the mechanism might be possible.

The ultimate phase of the intellectual development of the mechanism of perceiving fusion would include the awareness of and sensitivity to derivativeness going back much further than the span covered by the individual temporal existence of one physical object. One of the types of fusions distinguished by Pepper is in the range of abstractive thinking: the grasping of a very complex problem in a flash. Perceiving fusion of considerable density in art is analogous, on the level of non-abstractive knowing discussed here. When the mechanism of intellectual intuiting becomes less pedestrian, it no longer registers merely just minute derivativeness only from temporal phases of the actually existing individual immediately following one another, or its fused presentational immediacy exclusively, but refers to larger and larger fused ramifications of the cognitive object. The temporally distant antecedent phases of the object become in perception compressed in a flash, so that the object discloses itself as fused at an indefinite depth. The jumping mechanism of intuition enfolds within the specious present not only the phases actually perceived earlier and actually retained by the same perceiver but also the antecedent phases of the cognitive object inhering within it even from before the actual acts of perceiving of the same perceiver took place, that is independently of his previous perceptions.

The fused strata diverge into two opposite vectors, centripetal and centrifugal: on the one hand, the intuited unshareable identity of the work of art, imposed on all the ingredients, on the other,

[70] *Ibid.* 153. - Cf. *ibid.* 21-23. 25. 160.

the thickness of fusions shading off into utter anonymity, utter community, losing all individuality. Ultimately, this common stratum underlying every single existing individual is intuitively reached - when sight and hearing seem to recover their common evolutionary origins in touch. This tension between the unshareable and the reale univocum is another epistemological aspect which accounts for the psychological scale of aesthetic experience.

The artist deals with a variety of materials, but ultimately he deals with an individual identity and an immense derivativeness to be gripped by the former. Otherwise, what he is doing is not art.

There is one more difference between perceiving physical objects and perceiving art. This difference lies in the possibilities of exposition.

The perceptual mechanism evoked by the aesthetic situation is the mechanism adapted (adequate) to perceiving something as actually existing and as present, i.e. to perceiving the individual. This whole « aesthetic object », say, a musical composition, is in the aesthetic exposition shown completely in a relatively short time. Thus the evolution on the presentational immediacy level is shown complete in a short time, together with all that it involves as fused. The same complete individual totality, when we are perceiving, say, a tree, is not exposed to perception in its whole biological temporal evolution - the time of exposition is too short to exhaust it, or there are great gaps in our contemplating it. The tree perceived intermittantly is, as it were, like a few bars of the musical composition; now the whole immense derivativeness is not easily evoked by a few bars only. To look at a tree for a short time does not cover its individual evolution in the same way as the perception of the whole musical composition does with reference to this composition. But there is no logical reason why the mechanism of perceiving fusion could not start and develop even if the object is a tree. The cognitive availability of fusion as fusion does not depend on presentational immediacy as such but on the relation between presentational immediacy and causal efficacy, which relation makes fusion conspicuous.

People as individual concrete persons are, as the object of intuition, similar to trees, from the point of view of exposition; but similar to music from the point of view of great prehensive

complexity of fusion. Persons evolve much more slowly than music when it is exposed, and in a much longer time - but in rather more radically variegated stages than trees. Stones, again, change practically imperceptibly. In people though presentational immediacy is not always as fused as in art. This is more often the case in trees and animals.

Knowing the presentational immediacy of a person during his whole lifetime would be like tracing the whole structure of musical composition: but not necessarily like intuiting its prehensive fusion together as well. To know a person as fusion does not mean to know his personal history in terms of concepts, images, sensory appearances - but to know the « flavour », the key or pitch of the complete complex outcome of all the influences, all the derivative prehensions. Knowing a person intimately is like knowing intuitively the prehensive fusion of a musical composition. But in order to know a person intimately it is not necessary to know all his presentational immediacy history. People are fusions not only less or more complex, but above all less or more transconductive. The more the haecceistic stratum (unshareability) is fused right through with the whole prehensive derivativeness, the more readily is a person available for the intuitive perception as a transconductive cognitive object - quite apart from his presentational immediacy taken alone, which may be less fused than is the case in art; and apart from conceptual knowledge which may be, on the contrary, more difficult to unravel and then piece back together than the causal efficacy stratum of his personality. The presentational immediacy alone of a person may happen to be more or less fused and so either helpful or distracting for the purposes of knowing this person intuitively. Thus an intuition of a person, even limited temporally, may correspond to the intuition of the whole composition perceived as a fused derivative outcome, and not merely to a few bars heard in the middle of the composition.

For the intuitive perception of a person, an old human being may not be intuited as simply an old human being (a grey stone is «not grey»): he is like an advanced phase of an evolving musical complex individuality. On the other hand, quite a young but mature person may to an intuitive insight have a prehensive resulting «flavour» of a composition at an end.

«There are people who know general statements about human beings but have not the faculty of knowing the persons as individuals».

People, however, like only to be understood, they do not like to be contemplated [71].

The whole point of the aesthetic awareness, as differentiated from the presentational immediacy awareness, seems to be that the former involves a particular relation of both fusions: namely, the fusion of both fusions available for the cognitive insight - the relation which might be perhaps called « personality ».

Hence the extraordinary and distinct nature of the aesthetic awareness, its « enigmatic » psychological dimensions, which are testified to by all who have had a first hand experience, but which remains baffling to those who merely try to guess, from the outside, that it is « not-even-skin-deep ». As Eva Schaper remarks, the philosophers of the highest order do notice the serious significance of the aesthetic phenomenon; others do not.

The causal efficacy clue gives account for the intransitive attractiveness of the phenomenon of art and natural beauty, for the exclusive character of attention, for the profound and powerful influence on the psychology of the recipient, both as a shock in the very act of the encounter as well as in the intercommunication between him and the work of art and also permanently in the course of his life.

* * *

With a very different terminological apparatus - and to some extent different conceptual apparatus, too - both Scotus and Whitehead allow theoretically for the view of art as fusion, in the double sense, fusion raised to the square root.

Scotus does not actually make it his purpose to prove the unique logic of the intuitive perception of fusion. I was only considering the epistemological views implied by his various arguments for some metaphysical, psychological, and theological contentions.

The key contention of the Scotistic theory of prehensive cognition seems to be as follows. The intuitive knowing of the aspect of prehensiveness *can* develop, because:

[71] SAW R.L., *Our Knowledge of Individuals*, in PASS 52 (1951-52).

1) There is in everybody a rudimentary ability, the « pedestrian » stages of perceiving fused duration and derivativeness.

2) « Objects » are derivative indefinitely.

3) Ultimate polar discriminanda of concrete reality are absolute diversity (unshareability) of individuals, and the absolute sameness of the community of being: the unshareable identity and the communicable identity.

4) There are cognitive objects which particularly facilitate (subjectively and objectively) the perception of complex fusion. These are aesthetic objects.

5) The prehensive principle of the pattern underlying perceiving is not useful for any survival or profit activities of the perceiver, not suggested by his utilitarian wishfulness. And so it is probable, on the one hand, that for this reason it often remains undeveloped; but on the other hand, that the mode of perceiving aesthetically or prehensively is suggested by the structure of the cognitive object itself.

The new way of being aware may develop because - although the presentational immediacy sensa as a product of a superimposed organizing principle may remain unchanged - a different aspect of the cognitive object may start being perceived, under the influence of another organizing principle starting to work. The principle of organization may change gradually from « objects and their thereness » even to that of the reale univocum and haecceitates.

Art has gone all the way with us, has kept pace with us in the development of our presentational immediacy mode of perceiving, which we have developed primarily in order to recognize our « food » and our « enemy ». But art has deprived presentational immediacy of its selfishness: art uses it for other purposes than to make us recognize food and an enemy. Art uses presentational immediacy for the sake of tempting us to perceive disinterestedly, to achieve communication, to enjoy the sheer non-utility of an unshareability and of immemorial derivativeness; which enjoyment cannot lead to anything except love: love as the only motive of action, and also as an experiential source of philosophy.